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In this paper, the authors review some of the practical constraints preventing refugees accessing the rights specified in 
the 1951 Geneva Convention. The paper draws on the experiences of one European Union Member State, Greece, to 
illustrate those constraints. Although Greece itself is facing particular challenges in meeting its obligations to refugees 
under the Geneva Convention, challenges that are here acknowledged, these challenges nonetheless mean that in 
Europe, 60 years after the signing of the 1951 Convention, some refugees are unable to avail themselves of its 
protection. 
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Introduction 
Every Member State (MS) of the European Union (EU) is a signatory of the Geneva Convention, 
and as such, has undertaken to recognize refugees and uphold their rights as specified in that 
Convention. Through Art. 1 (the refugee definition) and Art. 33 (the prohibition against 
refoulement) the 1951 Convention, in principle at least, provides access to asylum procedures for an 
unlimited number of applicants, whether they enter MS ‘legally’ or ‘illegally’. European Treaties 
and Conventions have reinforced the commitment of MS to providing protection, in particular by 
guaranteeing a right to claim asylum and to have that claim considered under due process 
irrespective of whether the applicant entered the territory legally or not. Asylum seekers frequently 
enter the territory of the EU without documentation and in mixed flows, that is, together with others 
who are not seeking protection.  
Discouraging undocumented migration is a key policy goal for the EU and its MS. MS also 
interpret and implement their international and European obligations in different ways, leading to 
differing outcomes for asylum seekers dependent on which MS considers their claim. This article 
will contend that these two factors may mean that some people in need of protection are 
(inadvertently or otherwise) rejected without their claim being fully heard (Sales 2005). There is 
thus a tension between human rights and international obligations on the one hand, and EU policy 
goals and MS practice on the other, resulting in challenges faced by individual asylum seekers, 
Member States such as Greece, and ultimately the frontier-free, humanitarian entity that the EU has 
tried to construct. 
A single national case study approach will be used to assess the practical constraints on 
accessing the protection and rights guaranteed by the 1951 Convention, and EU law 60 years after 
its signing. We have chosen Greece for this case study because by 2009, 75 per cent of the detected 
undocumented border-crossings into the EU occurred on Greece’s land borders (Frontex 2010a). 
While half of these crossings are made by Albanian seasonal workers (Frontex 2010a), the 
remaining 50 per cent include potential asylum seekers and actual refugees.1 In addition, in recent 
years several MS have suspended returns to Greece under the Dublin Regulation because of doubts 
over the efficiency of Greece’s asylum procedures. These doubts have been highlighted by a 
number of cases of the European Court of Human Rights (e.g. SD v. Greece (2009); AA v. Greece 
(2010); Rahimi v. Greece (2011); MSS v. Greece and Belgium (2011)). We draw on research 
carried out by the authors in Greece and France.2  
Following a presentation of European and Greek asylum policy and legal contexts, the main 
part of this article will focus on some of the barriers to the fulfilment of rights which face refugees 
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seeking asylum in Europe. We concentrate on the constraints, potential and actual, faced by asylum 
seekers in Greece in achieving protection from refoulement, exercising their right to claim asylum 
and in being recognized as a refugee in the event that they meet the criteria of the 1951 Convention. 
 While acknowledging the particularities of the Greek situation, there is no intention to 
suggest that only Greece presents such difficulties. On the contrary, in spite of the particular 
economic, geographical and political challenges facing Greece, there have been and continue to be 
similar situations in other MS. In the late 1990s, and again in 2011 following arrivals from North 
Africa, Italy was the main entry point for undocumented migrants including asylum seekers. On 
both occasions, some of Italy’s northern neighbours threatened to close their borders with Italy 
unless it controlled the movement of would-be asylum seekers entering its territory (Schuster 2003, 
2005). Italy remains a cause for concern, as do some of the new MS, in particular Malta (Human 
Rights Watch 2009).  
The domestic constraints—political, social and economic—faced by Greece will be 
evaluated, as will constraints on the national situation arising from EU policies of solidarity and 
migration control. We argue that the interaction of domestic and EU policies has resulted in a 
situation in which asylum seekers in Greece are effectively prevented from achieving their rights 
under the Geneva Convention.  
 
The European Union Policy Context 
The drive to create a Common European Asylum System was given impetus by events in Europe in 
the 1990s, which saw an important increase in the number of people seeking asylum in the EU 
(Schuster 2000). In the early 1990s most of those seeking asylum in the EU were from Southeastern 
Europe, and the overwhelming majority (75 per cent) of those were found in the newly re-unified 
Germany (Schuster 2003). As a result, Germany began to argue for a policy of ‘burden-sharing’, 
insisting that it was unfair that asylum seekers were transiting a number of MS where they could 
have sought protection before making their claim in Germany (Schuster 2003). The search for an 
equitable solution to the ‘problem of burden-sharing’ (Thielemann 2008) has shaped in significant 
ways the policy of the EU and its MS. The Dublin Convention, and its successor the Dublin 
Regulation, which makes the first EU MS entered responsible for examining the asylum claim 
(except in some very tightly specified circumstances), is the most important element of that solution 
and attempts to reconcile tensions at the heart of EU asylum and migration policy.  
EU asylum policy is characterized by a contradiction between commitments to providing 
protection and to controlling migration into the EU. Core texts such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
the Tampere Conclusions and more recently, the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(art. 19) and the asylum directives all contain reiterations of the commitment to respect the Geneva 
Convention and the right to seek asylum (Pirjola 2009; Teitgen-Colly 2006) while moving towards 
ever closer cooperation on securing the external boundaries of the EU. At the same time, the 
harmonization process initiated with the Maastricht Treaty was designed to discourage ‘asylum 
shopping’ by harmonizing the asylum policies and procedures of member states, so that no one MS 
would be more attractive than any other, and to ensure that MS met their obligation that anyone in 
need of protection could claim asylum. Though some might argue that it was also designed to raise 
standards across the EU (Teitgen-Colly 2006; Thielemann and El-Enany 2009), others were 
concerned that it would initiate a race to the bottom (e.g. Hatton 2005; Noll 2000). However, for a 
variety of reasons including colonial links and geopolitical concerns, bilateral agreements with non-
EU states and jealously guarded sovereignty, EU efforts to harmonize policies have not been 
particularly successful, and there remains significant variation between MS (Pirjola 2009; UNHCR 
2007; Vedsted-Hansen 2005), especially in relation to recognition rates (see below), thus 
encouraging refugees to move through the EU before making an asylum claim. 
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As Lutterbeck (2006) argues, the emphasis on controlling the borders of the EU led to the 
increasing militarization of migration control in the Mediterranean area, initially with the co-
operation of the security forces of countries in the area. These efforts culminated in the 
establishment in 2004 of Frontex, a European agency charged with coordinating cooperation 
between MS in matters of border security (Leonard 2009). Increasingly, Frontex initiatives are 
expanding to other countries in Europe and beyond’ (Frontex 2010a). The EU has also entered into 
agreements with states like Libya, supporting the militarization of their borders in an attempt to 
reduce pressure on the EU’s external borders. Readmission agreements with third countries, both 
bilateral and at EU level, have become part of the externalization of asylum policies which aims at 
transferring the responsibility for migration control to countries outside the European Union (Guild 
et al. 2008; Hyndman and Mountz 2008). While a popular migration control tool for MS and the 
EU, readmission agreements are often imposed on the receiving country as a result of geo-political 
interests (Blitz 2009) and more importantly pose significant questions regarding the danger of chain 
refoulements of persons seeking protection (Billet 2010; Cassarino 2007). Inevitably, tighter border 
controls have serious implications for people seeking to access EU territory in order to claim 
asylum (Lutterbeck 2006). These problems are particularly relevant to the readmission agreement 
between Greece and Turkey, as will be discussed below. 
 
Asylum Policy and Law in Greece 
The effect of the policies outlined above on countries with EU external borders such as Greece has 
been significant. Greece has found itself under pressure to implement common EU standards of 
reception and procedures, while securing its frontiers against undocumented migrants, some of 
whom will be in need of protection, and to accept back from other MS asylum seekers returned on 
the basis of the Dublin Regulation (Mavrodi 2007; Papadimitriou and Papageorgiou 2005). Some of 
the most questionable Greek practices discussed in this paper, such as the prevention of access to 
the asylum procedure, have been attributed to the intense pressure on Greece resulting from its 
geopolitical position and membership of the EU (Mavrodi 2007; Papadimitriou and Papageorgiou 
2005). In the following section, we outline the national context, showing how the current Greek 
system has been shaped by the EU context.  
Although Greece was an early signatory of the Geneva Convention (1959) and the 1974 
constitution included a clause protecting those fighting for freedom (Black 1994), it was only in the 
1990s that it developed a legal framework for asylum (Karamanidou 2009: 72). The factors that led 
to this development were an increase in the number of asylum seekers, membership of the European 
Union and the end of UNHCR’s policy of resettling refugees from Greece (Karamanidou 2009). In 
other words, Greece was shifting from being a transit country to a potential ‘refuge’. In 1991, Law 
1975 adopted the refugee definition contained in Art. 1 of the 1951 Convention and regulated the 
procedures for applying for and granting asylum, before it was replaced in 1996 by Law 2452, 
which was aligned to developing EU soft law (Karamanidou 2009: 73). This law and subsequent 
Presidential Decrees (PD 189/1998, 61/1999 and 266/1999) regulated the asylum procedure until 
2008 and established a number of social provisions for asylum seekers. However, change 
accelerated from the early 2000s onwards as the number of asylum applications and of 
undocumented entrants increased sharply, and Greece replaced Italy as the most favoured entry 
point to the EU. The Dublin Regulation has been in place since 2003, the temporary protection 
directive was incorporated with PD 80/2006, the reception directive was incorporated with 
PD220/2007, while the Procedures and Qualifications directives were belatedly adopted in 2008 
(PD 96/2008 and 90/2008). The following section outlines the asylum procedures followed for the 
greater part of the last decade and highlights the changes introduced by subsequent PDs. 
Any alien requesting asylum, orally or in writing, was considered an asylum seeker (Art. 
1.1, PD 61/1999) and the request for asylum could be made to any Greek authority at the border or 
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inland, but the actual submission of the claim was to take place at a police station (Art. 1.1, 1.2). At 
the same time, the applicant was to be informed in a language she understands of her rights and 
responsibilities (Art. 1.6). In terms of the first instance examination of claims, PD 61/1999 specified 
that asylum claims should be examined ‘within three months from their submission’ by specially 
trained police and civilian personnel of the police authorities (Art. 2.2). The police authorities 
designated as responsible for the examination of claims were ‘sub-divisions [of Police Directorates] 
or Aliens Departments, Security Divisions of airports and Sub-divisions or Departments of Security 
of Police Directorates’ (Art. 2.1). Interviews were to be conducted by police officers or civilian 
personnel with the assistance of an interpreter (Art. 2.3). The answers of the applicant were 
recorded ‘in summary form’ (Art. 2.6). At the end of the interview, the interviewing officer 
composed a report stating their opinion on the merit of the claim and on whether the claim should 
be decided by the accelerated procedure. The case file was then forwarded to the Ministry of Public 
Order and the decision on whether to grant asylum was made by the General Secretary of the 
Ministry of Public Order (Art. 3.1). Asylum seekers were also to be provided with an identity card, 
otherwise known as the ‘pink card’, by the authority examining the claim (Art. 2.7). 
 PD 96/2008 and 90/2008 implementing the Procedures and Qualification Directives made 
only minor changes to this procedure: the presence of an interpreter became compulsory and the 
final decision on a claim was transferred to the Division of Political Asylum and Refugees of the 
Aliens Division at Greek Police Headquarters. Applications submitted at the borders, ports or 
airports were examined, as in PD 61/1999, under the accelerated procedure (PD 96/2008 Art. 24). 
PD 90/2008 introduced requirements for the provision of legal reasoning for decisions (Art. 4). In 
terms of the second instance procedure, an appeal against a decision should be submitted within 30 
days of the notification of the decision (PD66/1999 Art. 3.3; PD 90/2008, Art. 25). The same PD 
also gave decision-making powers to the new appeal committees which are based in the Ministry of 
the Interior. However, in the following year, PD 81/2009 introduced significant changes to the 
asylum procedure. It decentralized initial decision-making by transferring power to the directors of 
53 Police Directorates across the country, established Advisory Refugee Committees responsible 
for conducting asylum interviews and submitting a report on the claim and, most significantly, it 
abolished the second instance procedure (PD 81/2009, Art. 3). These changes were seen as highly 
problematic by Greek NGOs, who claimed that the diffusion of decision making powers allowed 
divergence in the practices of police directorates, and that the abolition of the second instance 
procedure amounted to creating a lack of an effective remedy in the sense of article 39 of the 
procedures directive (Amnesty International et al. 2009a; NCHR 2009). Greek NGOs also argued in 
relation to the above changes that: 
 
not only do they not improve an already problematic situation, but they create more 
significant obstacles to ensuring a fair and efficient asylum procedure in contravention to the 
Community Directive 2005/85/EC (Amnesty International et al. 2009b: 2).  
 
UNHCR withdrew its participation in the interviewing committees in protest (Amnesty 
International et al. 2009b). 
Soon after it was elected in 2009, the left of centre PASOK government, responding to 
widespread criticisms, promised to reform the asylum system. In November 2010 it introduced an 
interim PD (114/2010) replacing PDs 90/2008 and PD 81/2009, and incorporating the Procedures 
Directive into Greek law. It reinstated the second instance procedure, established committees for 
examining appeals against first instance procedures, reduced the number of examining authorities to 
14 and established a three-month time limit for the examination of applications for the accelerated 
procedure and a six-month limit for the normal procedure (Ministry for Citizen Protection 2010a).  
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A new asylum law (3907/2011) was passed in January 2011, introducing a radical reform of 
the asylum system. This provides for the establishment of an independent asylum system with 
regional offices,3 mostly in border areas, and a first reception authority, responsible for the 
‘management’ of migration into Greece and first reception centres in border areas. Financial and 
practical assistance has been promised by the European Commission to assist the Greek authorities 
with their reforms (Europa 2010). The law also incorporates the returns directive (Government 
Gazette 2011). While the new law does not yet reform the asylum procedurethis will be done by 
subsequent PDsregional offices are designated as the examining authority, while first reception 
centres are responsible for identifying vulnerable individuals needing specialized treatment and 
‘screening’ irregular entrants for the appropriate procedures (Art. 1 and 11). Reactions to the new 
law varied; UNHCR (2011a, 2011b) has welcomed the reforms as necessary and long overdue 
while remaining cautious regarding their future implementation, especially in relation to 
determining which migrants should be entitled to access the asylum procedure. The independence 
of the new asylum system has already come into question and concerns have been expressed 
regarding its implementation (Amnesty International 2011; Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) 
2010a; National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) 2010). At the time of writing, the new law 
has not been fully implemented, although first steps have been taken. For example, the Ministry has 
announced the designated locations for First Reception and Detention Centres, named the Directors 
for the Asylum Service and the First Reception Service, and hired psychologists, social workers and 
interpreters, some of whom have been already employed in detention centres in Evros (Ministry of 
Citizen Protection 2011a; Interview with senior police officer).  
The main complication regarding the implementation of the new asylum system is the 
overlap with legal provisions controlling entry. The current Law 3386/2005 (similar to Law 
2910/2001 before it) allows the arrest, detention and deportation of migrants entering Greece in an 
irregular manner. As illustrated below, the precedence of this law over asylum law has created 
significant obstacles to accessing asylum procedures (Greek Ombudsman 2007a; UNHCR 2009). 
This is likely to be true for Law 3907/2011, since migrants arrested for irregular entry will still be 
subjected to the provisions of Law 3386/2005 and excluded from the provisions of the Returns 
Directive (Amnesty International 2011; UNHCR 2011b). In addition, Greece signed a readmission 
agreement with Turkey in 2001, on the basis of which it can return irregular migrants to Turkey 
upon their arrest (Papadopoulou 2004; UNHCR 2009). The prioritization of laws controlling 
irregular migration should be seen as symptomatic of the pressure to control the external borders of 
the European Union, highlighted recently by the deployment of Frontex troops along the Greek–
Turkish border and the government intention to build a fence along part of the border in order to 
prevent irregular entry (Frontex 2010b; Ministry of Citizen Protection 2011b).  
In spite of weaknesses in the system, the provisions outlined above, incorporating the 
relevant EU directives and the Geneva Convention, should ensure that any individual entering the 
Greek territory is able to make a claim to refugee status, to have that claim examined and to enjoy 
the rights laid out in the Geneva Convention. In what follows we discuss practices that prevent 
asylum seekers from accessing these rights. 
 
Accessing Greek Territory 
Most undocumented migrants enter Greece overland through Turkey4 either by crossing the river 
Evros, or by crossing the Aegean to one of the Greek islands along the Greek–Turkish maritime 
border (Pro Asyl 2007; Triandafyllidou and Maroufof 2008). At this stage, the first obstacle asylum 
seekers face is accessing Greek territory: the next obstacle is access to the asylum procedure. 
Forced expulsions across the Evros river and Coast Guard practices of puncturing or shooting at 
dinghies so as to prevent their entry into Greek waters have been extensively documented (Amnesty 
International 2010a; Hammarberg 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008; NOAS et al. 2008; 2010; 
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NCHR 2008a, 2008b; UNHCR 2009). Even if successful in accessing Greek territory, migrants, 
including those seeking asylum, are likely to be arrested, detained and forcibly deported by the 
Greek security forces (Amnesty International 2010a; Greek Ombudsman 2007a; Hammarberg 
2008; NOAS et al. 2008; UNHCR 2009). This was illustrated by a number of young male Afghans 
interviewed by Schuster in 2009 in Paris who had made it through Greece after a number of 
attempts, and described being picked up by the Greek police and taken to cells where they would be 
held until they could be collectively expelled back across the Evros (Schuster 2011a; 2011b), 
without being allowed to claim asylum. The Greek ‘commandos’, as the Afghans called them, 
would herd them after dark into a boat 10 at a time and take them across the river where they would 
be forced out of the boat at gunpoint and forced to wade ashore on the Turkish side of the river. 
Similar accounts are repeated in a number of reports by NGOs (Amnesty International 2010b; 
NOAS et al. 2008; Pro Asyl 2007). 
From the perspective of the state, such practices preventing entry to Greece are part of 
guarding the European border from irregular entry (NCHR 2008a). However, they are in direct 
contravention of the Geneva Convention, and an effective bar to accessing the asylum procedure 
(Greek Ombudsman 2007a; Hammarberg 2008; UNHCR 2009). In that sense, these expulsions 
constitute refoulement and contravene Art. 33 of the Geneva Convention (Badar 2004; Hammarberg 
2009) which prohibits refoulement and the imposition of 
 
penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly 
from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or 
are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without 
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence (Art. 31).  
 
These two articles should ensure that those entering in such mixed flows are able to remain in a 
state’s territory until their claim is made and decided.  
The danger of refoulement becomes clearer if we consider that refugees attempting to enter 
Greece might be returned to Turkey, which has not adopted the 1967 Protocol broadening the 1951 
Convention to cover people from places other than Europe (Amnesty International 2010a; UNHCR 
2011c). Reports by NGOs recorded concerns over the chain refoulement of asylum seekers returned 
to Turkey, as there have been instances when they have been in turn refouled to neighbouring 
countries such as Iran and Iraq (Amnesty International 2010a; NOAS et al. 2008, 2010; UNHCR 
2009). While it is of course conceivable that not all migrants forcibly returned to Turkey would 
meet the definition of refugee contained in Art. 1 of the 1951 Convention, this case and others like 
it demonstrate that it is possible that some refugees will be refouled from Greece to territories 
where their lives and liberty are endangered.  
 
Accessing the Asylum System 
Related to concerns about physically entering the territory are concerns about being able to enter the 
asylum system. The number of applications lodged at borders has been very low: reports estimate 
that less than 5 per cent of total applications lodged are lodged at the border (Greek Ombudsman 
2007b, 2007c; NOAS et al. 2008). A report by the European Agency for Human Rights (2011) 
mentions that only 80 applications were submitted in the Evros region in 2010 (out of 10,273 for 
that year), while information obtained by the authors from a senior police officer in Evros gives an 
even lower number of 69 applications. However, in the first six months of 2011 the Police 
Directorate of Alexandroupoli had already received 131 applications.  
The persistently low applications at the borders might be attributed to several factors. The 
emphasis on preventing irregular entry means the Greek authorities at the borders have been 
reluctant to accept applications for asylum from those who enter without documents (Greek 
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Ombudsman 2007a, Hammarberg 2008; NOAS et al. 2008, 2010; NCHR 2008a; UNHCR 2009). In 
addition, according to NGOs providing legal advice (Greek Ombudsman, AITIMA, in personal 
telephone interviews, London November 2010), following the introduction of Advisory Refugee 
Committees by PD 81/2009, police departments became reluctant to receive applications because of 
the logistical difficulties in convening committees for the examination of claims. Other explanations 
include the limited access to legal assistance services and information on the asylum procedure 
(UNHCR 2011c), and the long detention periods imposed on asylum seekers in inadequate facilities 
(interviews with AITIMA and senior police officer; European Agency for Human Rights 2011; 
NCHR 2008a). Lack of dedicated police personnel (Greek Ombudsman 2011a) in conjunction with 
increased numbers of migrants crossing the Greek borders, especially in Evros, may also have 
contributed to the low number of applications lodged. 
Lodging an application inland is equally problematic. Ninety to 95 per cent of asylum 
applications are submitted at the Central Police Asylum Department (Petrou Ralli) in Athens 
(Amnesty International 2010a; Hammarberg 2008; NOAS et al. 2008; UNHCR 2009). The lack of 
organization and personnel in that department has resulted in long queues and considerable delays 
in lodging applications and obtaining the ‘pink card’ (Greek Ombudsman 2007a; GCR 2010b; 
NOAS et al. 2008, 2010). After the introduction of Presidential Decree 81/2009, the department 
accepted 200 claims a week (NOAS et al. 2010). However, in interviews referred to above, the 
respondents indicated that the number of claims submitted at Petrou Ralli fell to 20 per week in 
2010 (see also Amnesty International 2010a; NOAS et al. 2010; UNHCR 2009). Recent statements 
by NGOs indicate that problems with accessing the procedure remain, with only 40 applications 
being accepted weekly and severe delays in the examination of applications (Greek Ombudsman 
2011b; ARSIS et al. 2011).  
Asylum seekers (that is, those who have declared their intention of making a claim to 
asylum) returned to Greece under the Dublin Regulation also face difficulties in registering their 
asylum claims, and if they do so, there is a strong probability their applications will not be 
substantively examined (Amnesty International 2010a; GCR 2010b; NOAS et al. 2010). In the past, 
an asylum application could be deemed ‘withdrawn’ when the applicant changed his or her 
residence without informing the authorities, which was often the case with Dublin II returnees as 
between lodging an application and being returned to Greece a year or more could elapse (Amnesty 
International 2005; NOAS et al. 2008; Papadimitriou and Papageorgiou 2005; UNHCR 2008). 
While this practice appears to have stopped in recent years, difficulties in accessing the procedure 
and having an application examined remain (AITIMA 2010; Amnesty International 2010a; GCR 
2010b; NOAS et al. 2010). For example, the Greek Council for Refugees (2010b) has also noted 
that Dublin II returnees are not admitted at Petrou Ralli unless they have a notice or support from an 
NGO. 
According to Greek asylum law, once an individual has made a claim to asylum, he or she 
has the right to remain in the country where the claim has been lodged until a decision has been 
made. Yet, although official deportations either from the border areas or inland are rarely effected 
(interview with Administrative Court of Alexandroupolis; Human Rights Watch 2008) there is 
evidence that asylum seekers who have already lodged an application, including unaccompanied 
minors, have been returned to Turkey, possibly under the readmission agreement between the two 
countries (Amnesty International 2010a; Greek Ombudsman 2007a; Hammarberg 2008; NOAS et 
al. 2010). Deporting individuals who are in the process directly contravenes Art. 33 of the 
Convention as well as Greek asylum law, as highlighted in the European Court of Human Rights 
judgment S.D. v Greece (ECHR 2009).  
 
Problems with the System 
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There are a number of problems with the system, including impartiality, the inadequacy of 
substantive interviews, training, appeals and judicial reviews, and some of the consequences for 
asylum seekers, including the near impossibility of being recognized as a refugee. Some of these 
problems are addressed in a new 2011 law; however, whether the implementation of this law will 
resolve the difficulties remains to be seen. 
A first significant weakness of the Greek asylum system is the way the police and the 
responsible ministry have been assigned an exclusive central role in the asylum procedure. The 
Greek police are involved in the implementation of migration control policies, such as the arrest of 
migrants entering irregularly, and their detention and deportation, at the same time as being 
responsible for accepting and deciding on asylum claims. This renders them both ‘protectors and 
prosecutors’ of potential asylum seekers (NOAS et al. 2010: 22; Amnesty International 2010a; 
NCHR 2009; Papadimitriou and Papageorgiou 2005). The composition of the appeals committees 
has also undermined their independence and impartiality, as the majority of members represent 
ministries5 and the police (Hammarberg 2008; NOAS et al. 2008; UNHCR 2008). For Skordas and 
Sitaropoulos (2004), the organization of the Greek asylum system has been in 
 
[...] sharp contrast to international human rights and refugee law, as well as the fundamental 
principle of objectivity and impartiality that should characterize all aspects of the asylum 
process (2004: 40). 
 
Law 3907/2011 (art.1) establishes an independent asylum authority, but this will remain under the 
aegis of the Ministry for Citizen Protection, and personnel selected by this ministry are still heavily 
represented in committees examining and deciding on applications (GCR 2010a; NCHR 2010). 
Early efforts to partly implement the new law have been characterized by the same bias. A regional 
asylum committee has been established in Orestiada to examine claims independently from the 
police departments which receive them; however, the authority appears to be composed of police 
rather than civilian personnel (interviews with police officers in Evros).  
A second area of concern in the asylum system relates to the quality of the examination of 
claims and decision-making, which, in Greece, has been widely criticized on a number of grounds, 
including the conduct of the interview, the lack of training of personnel and the communication of 
decisions to applicants (Amnesty International 2010a; GCR 2010b; Hammarberg 2008; Greek 
Ombudsman 2007a; NOAS et al. 2008). Applicants have rarely been given the opportunity to 
explain their reasons for seeking asylum in a comprehensive and coherent manner (Amnesty 
International 2010a; NOAS et al. 2010; UNHCR 2009). The interviews tend to be short, to focus on 
the manner of entry rather than grounds for fearing persecution (NOAS et al. 2008; UNHCR 2009) 
and interviewee responses are frequently not recorded in case files (NCHR 2008a; UNHCR 2007). 
Conditions in the country of origin are often not examined or taken into account (NCHR 2008a; 
NOAS et al. 2008). The decision at the end of the interview is usually a negative one, stating that 
the applicant is an economic migrant and that the application should be examined under the 
accelerated procedure (NCHR 2008a; NOAS et al. 2008, 2010). In both first and second instance 
procedures, references to facts pertaining to individual cases, legal reasoning or detailed reasons for 
the refusal of an application are rarely provided, and standardized responses are used instead 
(Hammarberg 2008; UNHCR 2007, 2009). In addition, the quality of decisions on appeals was 
compromised by the high workloads of the committees, which did not allow the appeals to be 
examined in anything but the most cursory fashion (NCHR 2008a; NOAS et al. 2008, 2010). The 
decentralization of decision-making authority to 53 police directorates (PD 81/2009), designed to 
reduce the pressure on the centre, actually exacerbated these issues as divergences in the practices 
of police directorates undermine the uniform implementation of Greek asylum law and the Geneva 
Convention (Amnesty International et al. 2009a; NCHR 2009; UNHCR 2009).  
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Thirdly, provision for judicial review has always been limited, with the Council of the State 
(the Supreme Court of Greece) only deciding on administrative aspects and compliance with the 
law. It cannot order the re-examination of an application and cannot decide on the substance of an 
application (Amnesty International 2009a; NCHR 2009; Skordas and Sitaropoulos 2004; UNHCR 
2009).  
Fourth, access to legal aid has been problematic. As in all EU MS, negotiating the asylum 
system requires legal support, but neither Greek law nor the Procedures Directive allows for free 
legal assistance until the judicial review stage; until then, asylum seekers (and irregular migrants) 
can obtain legal aid ‘at their own expense’ (PD 96/2008; Amnesty International 2010a, 2010b; 
Hammarberg 2008). While private lawyers working on asylum cases are rare and financially 
beyond the reach of asylum seekers (Amnesty International 2010a, 2010b; Hammarberg 2008; 
NOAS et al. 2008; Pro Asyl 2007), free legal assistance is provided by Greek NGOs. For example, 
in the area of Evros, a team of lawyers from the Greek Council of Refugees visits detention centres 
on a daily basis to provide legal information and assistance with applications (interviews in Evros). 
Funding for such schemes is sometimes provided by the EU and the European Refugee Fund, but is 
subject to being discontinued and to delays (Amnesty International 2010a, 2010b; European 
Agency for Human Rights 2011; NOAS et al. 2008). Even so, overall the provision for legal 
assistance is deemed inadequate (Amnesty International 2010a; European Agency for Human 
Rights 2011; UNHCR 2011c). NGOs have extensively documented the routine denial of access to 
lawyers and NGOs wishing to visit places of detention (Amnesty International 2010b; NOAS et al. 
2008; Pro Asyl 2007). The Greek government have in the past justified this practice on the grounds 
of public order (Greek Ombudsman 2007b, 2007c). 
Similarly, the implementation of the asylum procedure is compromised by the lack of 
professionally trained interpreters in asylum interviews, in appeals, in detention centres and in 
police stations (Amnesty International 2010b; Hammarberg 2008; Pro Asyl 2007; NCHR 2008a; 
UNHCR 2009). Because of the lack of interpreters, asylum interviews have often been conducted 
without them and in English, a language in which neither interviewing officers nor asylum seekers 
may be competent (AITIMA 2010; Amnesty International 2010a). Concerns have also been raised 
repeatedly over the role and conduct of interpreters. In detention centres, detainees have sometimes 
acted as interpreters, a situation which, according to Pro Asyl, ‘gives rise to mistrust and fear’ 
(2007: 20). Interpreters have been directly employed by the police, raising questions about their 
impartiality, and there have been reports that they have on occasion actually conducted the asylum 
interviews (GCR 2010b; NOAS et al. 2008). According to the provisions of the new asylum law, 
interpreters are likely to be hired externally rather than directly employed by the future Asylum 
Service, but the details will not be clarified before the full implementation of the law.  
The lack of interpreters is compounded by the lack of information available to asylum 
seekers in languages they understand. While, for example, UNHCR has produced a leaflet for 
asylum seekers, this does not seem to have been widely distributed by the Greek authorities (NOAS 
et al. 2008). Amnesty International (2010a, 2010b) has reported that the information available is 
often insufficient and out of date (also GCR 2010b).  
 
Recognition Rates 
The consequences of the inadequacies of the Greek asylum system can be seen most clearly in the 
low refugee recognition rates in Greece (Table 1). Recognition rates have been low for Afghani, 
Iraqi and Somali nationals, groups whose claims for refugee status or subsidiary protection are 
clearly seen in the higher recognition rates found in other MS. A rise in Greek recognition rates in 
2010 (Table 2) could suggest improvements in the examination of claims and decision making 
although firm conclusions cannot be drawn yet on whether this signifies a radical change in the 
Greek asylum system.  
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Table 1 and Table 2 here 
 
The low recognition rates in Greece become more obvious in comparison to other MS (Table 3). In 
2009, Greece had the lowest recognition rate among all MS of the European Union, including 
countries with high numbers of entrants because of their location at the borders of the EU, such as 
Italy, Malta and Spain.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
A similar picture emerges if we look at the recognition rates among Afghani, Iraqi and Somali 
nationals (Table 3). Even with the increased rates of 2010, the overall recognition rate lags behind 
those of all other MS for which comparable data were available, with the exception of the 
Hungarian recognition rate for Afghans in 2010, at 5 per cent—three points lower than Greece. It is 
clear that even MS with low refugee recognition ratesfor example Bulgaria and Cyprus in the 
case of Iraqi applicants—compensate for this by granting of some form of subsidiary or 
humanitarian status. However, in Greece the actual number of people protected in this manner is 
also low.  
 
Analysis  
While not claiming that the Greek case is unique, it is an example of how domestic social and 
political arrangements and national approaches to European policies have interacted to produce a 
state of affairs that is highly problematic for refugee protection. Greece has been extensively 
criticized for the inadequacies of its asylum system. The asylum system as established by 
successive PDs since the 1990s has had several weaknesses, such as the lack of independent and 
impartial structures due to the over-involvement of the Greek police and ministries of public order, 
and the weak provisions for legal aid. In terms of legal arrangements, the overlap between laws 
regulating irregular migration and asylum laws has allowed the erosion of the right to access the 
asylum procedure and of the protection from refoulement. Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses, 
the legal frameworks over the last 15 years formally commit the state to minimum standards of 
protection.  
The extensive problems of the Greek asylum system have largely to do with how it is 
implemented. In part, some of these problems could be attributed to factors such as the attitudes of 
the police towards migrantswhich according to recent research tends to be negativeand that the 
police lack both training and expertise (see for example Tsoukala 2005; Antonopoulos et al. 2008). 
According to the police officers interviewed for this research, the capacity of the Greek police to 
deal with matters related to the asylum system is undermined by a variety of factors, such as the 
lack of training and specialization, the multiplicity of tasks they are asked to performwhich 
pertain to migration and asylum as well as other ordinary police dutiesand, as is often the case in 
the area of Evros, the difficult working conditions in the border detention centres. At the same time, 
many of the issues discussed in this article are linked to the administrative capacity of the public 
sector, especially in relation to the organization of the asylum system. Public administration in 
Greece has been marked by high levels of centralization, clientelist relations between the 
government and the civil service and inefficiency (Featherstone 2005; Sotiropoulos 2004). It is not 
surprising that the asylum system has reflected these shortcomings, but as Tsibiridou (2004) has 
noted, the inability to create procedural frameworks based on law has had adverse effects on the 
rights of migrants. For the same reasons, while the new asylum system has the potential to correct 
these shortcomings, it remains to be seen to what extent it will be affected by the deep-rooted 
problems of Greek administration—an issue raised by Greek NGOs, and highlighted by the current 
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financial crisis in Greece. Funding from the European Union, as promised by the Home Affairs 
Commissioner, will be crucial in that respect, but administrative organization and capacity has also 
affected the extent to which European funds have been absorbed, as a recent report by the European 
Agency for Human Rights has noted (2011).  
Resources are clearly vital for the improvement of the system (creating clean, humane and 
safe places of detention, providing interpreters and legal aid, for example). However, a more 
fundamental issue is whether there is the political will to make radical changes and respect the 
rights of asylum seekers. The actions and discourse of the current government seem to indicate that 
it is willing to transform the asylum system into one that could potentially afford greater respect for 
Convention and human rights standards. However, the rhetoric is not very different from that of 
previous administrations. Claiming to respect the Convention and human rights has been a standard 
practice of legitimation in Greek political discourse, even if the reality has not supported such 
claims6 (Karamanidou 2009). The current government will also have to contend with negative 
reactions, especially at the local level, to First Reception centres (I Gnomi 2011; Methorios 2011).  
 The same question of political will could be raised in relation to the policies of the European 
Union. While burden-sharing has been an aim of the EU policies, its application has been largely 
problematic. The difficulties faced by Greece are partly due to high pressures by migratory 
movements and the lack of efficient responsibility-sharing mechanisms. The Dublin Convention 
and Dublin Regulation have exacerbated the pressures on an already inadequate asylum system. It is 
very tempting to represent the various suspensions of Dublin returns to Greece as a ‘punishment’ 
for not coming up to standards of refugee protection. However, it should be highlighted that the 
current government requested the suspension of the Dublin Regulation and recently even welcomed 
the suspension of returns by Germany as recognition of the pressures faced by Greece (Ministry of 
Citizen Protection 2010b, 2011c). The response to Greece’s request for assistance in controlling its 
border with Turkey followed much more promptly, with the deployment of a 175-person strong 
multinational rapid border intervention team (RABIT) under the EU border agency Frontex at the 
Greek–Turkish border. While an example of burden-sharing, this highlights that prioritizing 
migration control and a security framework over protecting refugee rights is a policy choice of the 
EU (Carrera and Guild 2011). Although the European Agency for Human Rights notes indications 
that the number of migrants being ‘pushed back’ to Turkey has declined since the deployment of 
the RABIT operation, it also notes that ‘there are no clear instructions or rules of engagement 
within the Hellenic police in dealing with migrants who have just crossed the border’ (2011: 21), 
and as a result, the fundamental rights of migrants, including refugees, cannot be guaranteed. 
The Greek case also highlights the difficulties of ensuring minimum standards of protection 
across MS. On the one hand, it illustrates the possibility that national frameworks can diverge from 
EU standards of protection; the abolition of the second instance procedure by PD81/2009 is an 
example of this. On the other hand, it shows that even when EU frameworks have been adopted 
their implementation can fall short of minimum standards: for example, problems of lack of legal 
reasoning in asylum decisions persisted after the implementation of the Procedures and 
Qualifications directives. 
Finally, with regard to the tensions between controlling entry and refugee protection, it 
could be argued that one of the reasons behind practices running counter to Convention and human 
rights is the emphasis placed on preventing irregular entry to the European Union, a goal shared by 
both Greek and EU asylum policies. In the Greek case, the prioritization of migration control 
frameworks such as Law 3386/2005 and the readmission agreement with Turkey have a negative 
impact on access to refugee protection. The compatibility of border control practices with the 
principle of non-refoulement, as Carrera and Guild (2011) have argued, is a serious issue in the 
Greek case.  
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Conclusion 
There are broad lessons to be learnt from the Greek experience. The Achilles heel of Europe shifts 
around its frontiers. For a number of years the key gateway was Italy and then Spain. Already more 
people are moving through Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria and Hungary, and once 
again Italy is moving to the forefront of receiving countries as the Arab Spring sends people 
northwards across the Mediterranean. So long as migrants could pass more or less unimpeded 
through these countries and choose where to make their claims, on the basis of rational choices such 
as support networks, language skills and labour demand, these gateway states did not have an 
asylum or a migration problem. The key destination countries also shift and change. In the early 
1990s it was Germany, later France and the UK. Although these countries have managed to reduce 
the number of asylum applications they register, it has been at great cost to individuals who, 
impeded in their attempts to seek asylum, are treated as irregular migrants; forced to wait many 
months, often on the streets of cities like Athens, while MS decide which state should examine their 
claim (Schuster 2011a, 2011b). The cost for a state such as Greece is also great, in terms of 
resources, reputation, and public order. The cost to the EU as a whole reflects this, as the very 
systems of harmonization, and indeed the idea of a frontier-free and humanitarian Europe, are put 
fully to the test. And, 60 years after the signing of the 1951 Convention, one must ask what the cost 
is for the refugee regime writ large. 
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1. Many of these latter only ever intend to transit Greece (Schuster 2011a, 2011b; also Papadopoulou 2004, 2007), but 
there are others who continue their journey because of the difficulties they face in making an asylum claim or in being 
recognized as a refugee in Greece, or because of their mistreatment by the Greek authorities (Schuster 2011b; NOAS et 
al. 2008; Papadopoulou 2004). We note that people are refugees prior to acquiring the status of asylum seeker, and prior 
to recognition as a refugee by a state. 
2. Karamanidou has recently completed a study of asylum in Greece and Ireland, and conducted extensive legal 
documentary research, supplemented by interviews with key stakeholders in Athens and the Evros region in November 
2010 and July 2011. Schuster has been working with Afghan asylum seekers and refugees in Paris since June 2008, 
most of whom had travelled through Greece, and who had experienced being deported to and from Greece. The 
preferred legal term is removal, with the term deportation normally reserved for historical events and the expulsion of 
foreign criminals. However, we are using it here to describe the expulsion from a MS territory of those not allowed to 
claim asylum or not allowed to pursue their claim with legally prescribed support. 
3. In a separate development, the local government system was also reformed in 2010; regional asylum offices 
correspond to the new level of regional administration introduced by the local governance law. Some of the 
responsibilities regarding reception previously belonging to prefectures are transferred to regional authorities. 
4. Excluding Albanian nationals, who can be classified as labour migrants. 
5. Appeals Committees have included  representatives of the Ministry of Public Order and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (PD 60/1999; the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PD 90/2008); the Ministry of Interior, 
Decentralisation and e-Government and the Minisrty of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights (PD 114/2010 
(Government Gazette 1999; 2008; 2010). 
65. For example, the previous New Democracy administration has often stated that it respects human rights and 
Convention rights (Ministry of the Interior 2008) in order to respond to criticisms by MS and NGOs, while at the same 
time taking measures such as abolishing the appeals procedure. 
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Table 1  
Recognition Rates in Greece 
 
Year Level of 
procedure 
Applications Convention 
status 
Humanitarian 
status 
Rejections Applications/ 
appeals 
examined 
Convention 
recognition rates 
Humanitarian status 
recognition rates 
2006 First Instance 12,267 5  10,414 10,419 0.05%  
Second Instance 5,247 59 63  2,837 2.08% 2.22% 
2007 First Instance 25,113 8  20,684 20,692 0.04%  
Second Instance 17,072 132 23  6,448 2.05% 0.35% 
2008 First Instance 19,884 14  22,188 29,573 0.05%  
Second Instance 13,368 344 21  3,342 10.29% 0.63% 
2009  First instance 15,928 11 19 14,190 29,501 0.04% 0.06% 
Second Instance 12,095 25 11  870 2.87% 1.26% 
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2010  First Instance 10,273 60 35 3,348 3,453 1.73% 1.01% 
Second Instance 1,648 35 0  41 85.3%1 0% 
 
 
Source: UNHCR Greece 2010. 
1. This high percentage, according to the UNHCR office in Greece, is due to the ‘extremely low number of cases examined at second instance in 
2010, which concerned serious cases of refugees in crisis’ (UNHCR 2010). 
 
Table 2 
 
Recognition Rates (%) of Selected Nationalities in Greece 
 
 2008 2009 2010 
 Afghans Iraqis Somalis Afghans Iraqis Somalis Afghans Iraqis Somalis 
Applications 2,287 1,760 149 1,510 886 140 525 342 141 
Refugee Status * * 0 2 8 0 9 12 2 
Other 
Protection 
0 0 0 0 0 0 7 * 0 
Convention % 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 4 8 6 
Total 
Recognition 
0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 10 13 13 
 
 
Source UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2008; 2009; 2010. 
* indicates between 1 and 4 applications in the UNHCR statistics. The exact numbers were not yet available in the Hellenic Police 
statistics. 
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Table 3 
 
Comparative Recognition Rates (%) in 27 MS 
 
MS 
2009 2010 
Total* 
Con 
 
Total** 
Afghanistan Iraq Somalia Afghanistan Iraq Somalia 
Con Tot Con Tot Con Tot Con Tot Con Tot Con Tot 
Austria 17.7 26.0 34 36 49 80 57 77 26 57 24 69 60 87 
Belgium 22.4 29.0 29 48 38 75 20 37   33 79 25 50 
Bulgaria 6.0 41.3   5 67     0 49 4 33 
Cyprus 53.3 53.3   1 93     0 66   
Czech 
Republic 
14.9 20.4             
Denmark 22.2 44.1 2 54 19 46 3 58 2 41 6 24   
Estonia 4.8 9.5             
Finland 6.4 77.8 7 75 7 89 0 96 8 56 8 70 1 88 
France 11.1 14.5 33 37 79 82 40 79 31 34 73 74 38 69 
Germany 36.5 42.9 67 11 75 77 70 93 12 47 5 57 75 91 
Greece 0.1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 8 10 6 13 
Hungary 9.7 22.4       3 5     
Ireland 3.6 3.6     14 14       
Italy 10.1 43.5 25 87 84 88 10 95 24 91 32 79   
Latvia 18.5 40.7             
Lithuania 7.6 29.2             
Luxembourg 29.5 30.5             
Malta 0.8 65.5     0 92       
Netherlands 4.2 48.3 3 33 5 42 2 65 3 35 6 54 2 65 
Poland 2.0 38.3             
Portugal 3.0 52.0             
Romania 7.7 10.6       11 31     
Slovakia 3.2 25.5             
Slovenia 14.4 18.9             
Spain 4.0 7.6     0 7       
Sweden 7.5 37.0 13 73 8 26 11 85 11 72 34 54 9 93 
UK 19.3 29.0 8 51 9 21 44 51 9 36 9 19 45 55 
 
 
Source: Compiled from UNHCR Statistical Reports 2009 and 2010.  
Blank cells indicate fewer than 100 applicants from named source countries. 
*Total given Convention Status 
** Total given protection 
 
 
